


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EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE
IN THE 1980's

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Strategic issues and problems of Europe

6 EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE
IN THE 1980's.

by

10 Edward A. Corcoran

11 30 Jan 1981

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
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FOREWORD

This memorandum proposes the evolutionary development of a nonnuclear NATO defense based upon political and conventional military elements. While maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent, such a posture would encourage the growth of East European autonomy and stress four main military elements: combat maneuver forces, strong territorial elements capitalizing on the high lethality of modern weaponry, support troops prepared to conduct effective emergency combat operations and a measured development of penetration forces for operations in enemy territory. By reinforcing the defensive orientation of NATO forces to the point where war would clearly be an unprofitable venture for the Warsaw Pact, such an approach offers opportunities to encourage a long-term reorientation from military into economic and social competition.

The Strategic Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a means for timely dissemination of analytical papers which are not constrained by format or conformity with institutional policy. These memoranda are prepared on subjects of current importance in areas related to the authors' professional work.

This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J N M", is written over a horizontal line.

JACK N. MERRITT
Major General, USA
Commandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD A. CORCORAN joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1978 after a tour as materiel officer at an ammunition depot in Korea. An ordnance officer with a background in missiles and special weapons, he holds a doctorate in political science from Columbia University and is a member of the Foreign Area Officers Program specializing in the Soviet Union. Past assignments have included service in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Headquarters, US Army Europe, and as a liaison officer to the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in East Germany.

SUMMARY

Despite NATO's clearly superior resources, the large, armor-heavy standing forces of the Warsaw Pact can threaten to overwhelm the NATO conventional defense. NATO's forward defense strategy inhibits planning for operations in overrun areas, while urban warfare, rear area security and the forward movement of troops and reinforcements pose serious problems for the NATO defense. Consequently, NATO relies heavily on a nuclear deterrent which, unfortunately, is losing credibility in the face of continuing Pact improvements. At the same time, internal economic problems are making it increasingly difficult for NATO nations to maintain desirable military budget levels.

This paper outlines an approach to redress this imbalance by developing a politico-conventional European defense designed to strengthen the entire range of political, economic, social and psychological factors inhibiting the Warsaw Pact leadership from initiating hostilities.

The active cooperation of East European countries would be critical for the success of any Warsaw Pact attack, but there is little real incentive for East European leaders to support such a move. They would bear the brunt of NATO countermeasures. The political aspects of the NATO defense, while recognizing legitimate defense needs, must diminish the offensive capabilities of both sides and support development of a more autonomous and self-reliant East European leadership. The defense must focus on political solutions to European problems, encouraging competition in social and economic fields and convincing the Soviets that such a shift is also in their long-term interests.

A crucial element in encouraging the Soviets to seek political solutions is a viable NATO military posture which does not foresee a rapid resort to nuclear weapons and is not susceptible to easy neutralization by Pact nuclear weapons. Such a defense could be constructed from four main elements: **Area Combat Troops**, conventional combat forces, support troops and penetration elements.

Area Combat Troops would be territorial forces organized to have maximum immediate impact of the Pact's combat capabilities. Within NATO-controlled areas they would have a rear area security mission. In overrun areas they would disorganize Pact

armor formations, inflicting maximum attrition by standoff engagement with modern weaponry. They would also neutralize specialized Pact command and support elements, disrupt crucial ammunition and POL supply and provide detailed current intelligence to regular NATO combat forces.

NATO's regular combat forces would seek to engage Pact combat elements under favorable conditions, taking advantage of the intelligence provided by the Area Combat Troops and of the disruption and attrition they inflict on Pact units. Regular combat forces would emphasize antiarmor and air defense capabilities and make wide use of combat engineer units to impede and canalize Pact movements.

Support troops would engage in effective combat operations when required by circumstances. They would act in conjunction with local Area Combat Troops and place a similar emphasis on standoff engagement of selected Pact targets.

Finally, penetration elements, including Ranger and Special Forces units, would provide a capability to carry combat operations into the Pact's vulnerable rear area.

Such a NATO politico-conventional defense would seek to convince Pact leadership that war is an unattractive option in solving European political problems. By encouraging competition in more constructive fields it could serve as a basis for long-term solutions to European and world security.

EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE IN THE 1980's

The 1980's give every indication of being a decade of change and uncertainty in Europe. Economic problems, exacerbated by the energy crisis and the effects of widening North-South issues, are unsettling internal conditions in both East and West Europe. Partially as a result of these problems, the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance is being severely strained while the Soviet Union, having achieved essential strategic equivalence with the United States, has become increasingly adventuresome in its global military operations. The Soviet leadership itself is beginning an inevitable generational change; whatever policy shifts will result from this can only be speculated at. Such a period of change certainly poses a number of dangers, but it also provides opportunities for the United States to encourage European strategic development in favorable directions. This paper will try to develop some of these directions.

The constant change in the European politico-military situation requires NATO to continually reassess its strategy vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact. This strategy must provide a reasonable assurance of attaining the NATO goals by taking advantage of NATO strengths while capitalizing on Pact vulnerabilities and weaknesses.

Militarily, NATO seeks, in the words of the charter, "to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area" in the event of an armed attack against a member state. But the fundamental NATO goal is much broader, "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." Thus, NATO seeks to develop a durable structure of international relationships, inhibiting the causes of war and promoting long-term East-West relations through the implementation of such principles as those expressed in the Helsinki Final Act, including the elimination of tensions and the increase of confidence between European states; economic and humanitarian cooperation; and freer circulation of information.

While NATO has clearly superior economic resources, the Pact has been able to translate its relatively smaller resources into an impressive and threatening military presence considerably superior in conventional military forces.¹ Furthermore, there are few prospects for change in some of the underlying factors which have led to this conventional military imbalance in Europe. A sizable proportion of NATO's economic and military resources belongs to the United States and Canada, and the Atlantic Ocean makes it difficult to bring these forces to bear in Europe. Additionally, budgetary pressures are restraining NATO military expenditures while Warsaw Pact expenditures continue to increase. This imbalance is made all the more worrisome by the higher percentage of the Pact budgets spent on equipment. Furthermore, this equipment is often simpler than the corresponding NATO equipment, so it costs less and can be produced at a great rate. The effect of these inequalities is vividly illustrated by the tank imbalance (20,500 versus 7,000 in North and Central Europe), but is visible throughout the NATO-Pact equipment balances.

Table 1 summarizes NATO and Warsaw Pact manpower assets. The NATO figures show striking differences in military manpower per ten thousand population, ranging from 6.6 for Iceland to 694.4 for Norway. These gross figures, of course, cover a wide range of specific circumstances and lump together a variety of manpower categories. At the extremes, Iceland has only a small force of coastal patrol boats while Norway and Denmark have extensive systems of territorial reserve forces. Other countries, such as Italy and Greece, also have proportionately large reserve forces, but do

not have the detailed territorial organization of Norway or Denmark. While their reserve forces could fill out existing units and serve as manpower replacements, the bulk of them would not have an impact during the critical early days of a major conflict. The clear implication of this table is that NATO has a potential to field considerably larger forces than the Warsaw Pact, but the Pact currently has a clear edge on available military manpower.

Country	Total Population (thousands)	Military Manpower			Military Manpower per 10,000 Population
		Regular	Reserve	Paramilitary	
Belgium	10,010	86,800	54,400	16,300	157,500
Britain	55,940	322,811	257,600	580,491	103.7
Denmark	5,140	34,650	154,260	184,910	367.5
France	53,740	509,300	350,000	85,400	944,700
FRG	61,600	495,000	755,000	20,000	1,270,000
Greece	9,490	184,500	290,000	129,000	603,600
Italy	57,200	365,000	738,000	196,500	1,299,500
Luxembourg	360	660	114,820	171,000	430
Netherlands	14,100	39,000	245,000	8,200	294,020
Norway	4,090	60,500	425,000	31,850	286,000
Portugal	9,940	44,400	566,000	120,000	92,350
Turkey					1,111,000
NATO Europe	325,940	2,779,221	3,440,260	607,680	6,827,161
Canada	23,920	80,000	19,200	99,200	41.5
Iceland	227			150	150
United States	220,500	2,022,000	818,700	2,840,700	128.9
NATO Total	570,387	4,881,221	4,278,160	607,680	9,767,211
Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact	108,940	1,105,000	2,145,000	2,150,000	5,400,000
Soviet Union	261,300	3,618,000	5,000,000	460,000	9,118,000
Warsaw Pact Total	370,200	4,763,000	7,145,000	2,610,000	14,518,000
Source:	<u>Date compiled from The Military Balance 1979-1980</u>				

Table 1. NATO and Warsaw Pact Military Manpower

NATO also has some major psychological advantages. With the exception of Bulgaria, East Europe is culturally oriented toward Western political and social concepts while strong undercurrents of anti-Soviet and anti-Russian feelings have been vividly apparent during periods of unrest. Such feelings have also surfaced in the Soviet Union itself, notably in the Baltic states and in the Ukraine where anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare persisted into the 1950's.

Unfortunately, NATO could not easily profit from these economic, manpower and psychological advantages in the early stages of a military conflict. This leaves NATO relatively vulnerable to a rapid offensive which could overwhelm it before its superior resources could be brought to bear and before disintegrative stresses could destroy Pact cohesion. Thus the Soviets have strong incentives to seek a short war and, indeed, their armor-heavy forces are well structured to fight just such a war.

The conventional forces imbalance is exacerbated by a number of other factors which favor the Warsaw Pact. For example, NATO's defensive military orientation concedes the initiative to the Pact and NATO decision making requires time-consuming multilateral consultations, while Pact command and decision-making are dominated by the Soviets. But the most sweeping NATO problems concern the operational issues of forward defense, rear area security, reinforcement, and exploitation of Pact vulnerabilities.

NATO's forward defense strategy is necessitated not only by political considerations but by the lack of strategic depth in Central Europe.² Yet, the forward concentration of NATO forces makes the defense vulnerable to massed breakthroughs. The Pact's large armor forces are ideally suited for exploiting this vulnerability, particularly in view of the relative lack of NATO mobile reserves and the Pact's capability to choose the time and place of any attack. Furthermore, economic and political considerations have resulted in the peacetime stationing of a number of major NATO units far from their frontline deployment positions. The ability of these maldeployed units to move into their forward defense positions is seriously hampered by two major factors. First, such a movement could be taken as provocative by the Warsaw Pact and bring on the very hostilities it tries to inhibit; concern over this issue could easily inhibit an allied decision to move units forward. Second, the Pact has a substantial capability (discussed below) to

disrupt NATO rear area operations, including movements of combat forces. As a result of these two factors, many NATO forward defense positions might not even be manned at the outbreak of hostilities, further increasing the likelihood of a major Pact breakthrough.

But the most deleterious effect of the NATO forward defense strategy is its inhibiting influence on planning for fighting within NATO territory. Some NATO territory would unavoidably be overrun in the early stages of any conflict, but planning for operations in such areas involves, inevitably, trading space for time—exactly what the forward defense strategy seeks to avoid. Once the legitimacy of trading space for time is accepted, it becomes extremely difficult to draw a line on what is acceptable and what is not, particularly as far as German sensitivities are concerned. This inhibiting effect is most clearly seen in the lack of systematic NATO planning for fighting in urban areas. In the immediate postwar period, with vivid memories of urban devastation, West Germany was understandably concerned about reducing the risk to its cities by building a strong NATO deterrent posture and by deflecting combat from major urban areas. The US nuclear umbrella provided good protection for European cities, while US strategic superiority insured that the risk was also low for US cities. Furthermore, if deterrence failed, Warsaw Pact forces showed no inclination to bog down in urban fighting. Their doctrine stressed bypassing population centers and fighting in the relatively open countryside. Consequently, NATO did not develop an urban defense force which could have made the cities strong points of the allied defense, but would have also increased the likelihood of widespread urban destruction. Thus, the risk to NATO's cities, both in Europe and the United States, remained low.

However, 30 years of urban sprawl have totally obliterated any prospects for European war without extensive urban warfare. Urban areas can no longer be protected by NATO's capability to fight in the countryside. In fact, NATO's arsenal has come to include such a diverse stock of theater nuclear weapons that its very fighting capability threatens widespread urban destruction. This has made deterrence all the more important, but deterrence has also changed significantly. With the advent of essential strategic equivalence, the risk to US cities has grown dramatically. This has

fed European concerns that the United States would be unwilling to involve its strategic forces in a theater war, which would then devastate Europe with either nuclear or conventional weapons, but leave the United States and the Soviet Union generally untouched. By pressing for assurances that the United States will not decouple its strategic nuclear forces, West Europeans are insisting that US cities be held at a relatively high warfare risk. Yet there is still a strong tendency to maintain a low risk for European cities by continuing to avoid systematic NATO planning for urban warfare. Unfortunately, an increased risk to European cities is necessary for constructing a credible deterrence which more than ever requires a strong conventional capability, including specialized troops and weapons for fighting in an urban environment. Paradoxically, systematic planning for urban combat, by increasing deterrence, can actually lower the risk to both European and US cities. The present lack of planning for systematic fighting in overrun areas makes a Warsaw Pact attack more attractive because it eases the Pact task of consolidating control over any seized territory and simplifies security within its tactical rear area.

A second major operational problem for NATO is rear area security. Few NATO installations are in hardened sites. Hundreds of headquarters elements, telecommunications sites, support units, port facilities, storage depots (including ammunition, POL and POMCUS) and other installations are at lightly defended locations well known to the Warsaw Pact. And it is clear that the Pact plans to capitalize on these NATO vulnerabilities. Thousands of Pact agents are estimated to be in place in West Europe; hundreds more could easily be infiltrated prior to hostilities as legal travellers and merchant seamen, or even in sealed international road or river cargo. Added to this are the sizable Pact airborne and airmobile forces, many of which are specifically trained for disruption of the NATO rear area.³

A particularly troublesome aspect of the rear area security problem is the thinness of the NATO air defense net, especially in the face of sizable Pact air and missile forces able to incapacitate selected critical installations at the outbreak of hostilities.

Another troublesome aspect is the high percentage of support troops within NATO and their modest preparations for combat operations. Even in a US infantry division, about half of the division base is headquarters or support troops. Overall, NATO

has several hundred thousand such troops who are generally not prepared to fight effectively if the situation requires it. US headquarters and support troops, for example, are typically required to fight as infantrymen when necessary. But this is usually taken to mean fighting as riflemen in perimeter security roles or against small raiding parties. There is no combat organization and little training in the use of machine guns, light antitank weapons, mines or explosives, particularly among the growing percentage of women soldiers. This means that there are several hundred thousand NATO troops who can have only a minimal impact in direct combat. Pact forces do not have to defeat them, but only defeat the combat units which protect them.

A third NATO operational problem is reinforcement. The bulk of NATO reinforcements come from the United States. Their projected deployment times to Central Europe compare poorly with the projected times of massive Soviet reinforcements from the Western Military Districts of the USSR.⁴ Furthermore, any requirements for other contingencies (say, Korea, Cuba or Alaska) would reduce the forces available for Europe, as would any interdiction of the lines of communication or disruption of air terminals, sea ports or POMCUS sites.

A final operational shortcoming in NATO's conventional defense is its unpreparedness to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Warsaw Pact rear area tactically and strategically. These Pact vulnerabilities include the susceptibility of fast-moving armor columns to attack from the flanks; dependence on truck and pipeline resupply of POL and ammunition; meager organic defense for logistics and headquarters elements; and numerous specialized elements (such as communications vans, traffic regulators, messengers, chemical defense equipment and missile launch vehicles) which move independently in the Pact rear area. While NATO does plan for air and missile strikes on key elements of the Pact rear area, there is no systematic planning for ground operations even, as mentioned above, in overrun areas.

Against this background of a conventional force imbalance and serious operational problems, NATO relies heavily on its nuclear weapons to serve as a counterbalance. Rising doubts on the credibility of the US strategic umbrella have already been discussed—would the United States expose its own cities to massive destruction in what might prove to be a futile attempt to halt a Pact

invasion of Europe?⁵ But even if nuclear war in Europe, with the thousands of warhead theater weapons available to both sides, halted a Pact invasion, would widespread devastation make the cure worse than the disease? From the West European point of view, it is hard to envision a successful nuclear war.⁶ Nevertheless, a credible deterrent requires the maintenance and even improvement of large nuclear forces. Otherwise, the Soviet nuclear capability could comprise such an overwhelming threat that NATO Europe would be very vulnerable to Soviet political pressure.

And, if the nuclear balance were not frightening enough, massive Soviet chemical warfare capabilities totally overshadow the modest NATO retaliatory capability,⁷ without even considering Soviet capabilities for biological warfare. Although this is prohibited by treaty, the secretive Soviet society is certainly capable of concealing a surreptitious capability; a recently reported anthrax epidemic has raised a strong suspicion that they are doing exactly that.⁸

As a result of the military imbalance and these exacerbating factors, NATO is widely considered as incapable of conducting an extended conventional defense; pessimistic assessments foresee a Pact capability to reach the Rhine in as little as 48 hours. While continuing NATO improvements make such a rapid Warsaw Pact advance unlikely, there is a definite concern that NATO will rapidly face a decision to either accept extensive loss of territory or to escalate to nuclear warfare.⁹

These concerns over the military balance naturally breed a strong tendency to view European security in terms of the military balance. Budget competition between military and nonmilitary expenditures are seen as security versus economic development, even though it is obvious that NATO cannot gain long-term security by military means. Military assets do stabilize the short-term situation so that long-term political and social solutions to European security can be developed. But assets which NATO uses for short-term security (i.e., military requirements) are then not available for long-term security (i.e., political and social stabilization). Even assets put into civilian consumption improve Western security because they improve the quality of life in the West—a telling aspect of the West's psychological advantage over the East. Marxism is an economic religion, and its obvious failure in this area severely undermines its claim to legitimacy.

But more important than such theoretical considerations is the actual impact of economic development on the internal stability of

NATO countries. Turkey is an extreme example where several billion dollars of economic developmental aid are only beginning to counter the growing internal unrest.¹⁰ Clearly, Turkey's considerable military assets will be of little use if the country descends into turmoil and anarchy. Turkey's case is not unique. The Greek government also faces severe economic problems and a vocal leftist minority. Its disputes with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean basin are rooted in deep historical animosities. They threaten to shatter the cohesion of NATO's entire southern flank, yet they cannot be resolved as long as economic miseries provide a deep reservoir of emotional radicalism.¹¹

In Italy, perennially unstable governments face a growing challenge from the Communist Party, which also wields considerable influence in France, while Portugal nearly fell under a Communist-dominated leftist coalition. Even in Scandinavia, Great Britain and the United States, growing economic problems are feeding political divisiveness. Nor are disruptive economic problems all internal to NATO. The North-South split becomes more salient daily as Third World countries assert the growing political power stemming from raw materials, particularly oil.

The United States has spent some \$25 billion in economic and military assistance to the Middle East because the alternative to such massive expenditures is the even more massive expenditures caused by war and instability. Four Middle East wars cost the United States alone more than \$55 billion and led to oil price rises which have cost the West many additional billions since the early 1970's.¹² Economic problems have fueled political instability in the region, as vividly illustrated by Iran. This in turn has invited Soviet adventurism, illustrated equally vividly by Afghanistan, and starkly raised the specter of radical anti-Western control of the entire Middle East.

With such security problems so closely tied to economics, it was hardly surprising that the mid-1980 meeting of NATO heads of state focused on this.¹³ The long-term stability of the alliance and the security of its members depend heavily on economic development. Security can simply no longer be assessed in narrow military terms.¹⁴

NATO's task for the 1980's is how to redress these problems, reduce the probability of war (particularly nuclear war) and still devote sufficient assets to the long-term political and social efforts on which real European security must be based. The remainder of

this paper will outline a politico-conventional defense for NATO Europe which could provide a direction or evolution for the NATO military posture.

Unfortunately, because of the threat of nuclear blackmail, there is no way to avoid the maintenance of sizable strategic and theater nuclear capabilities for the foreseeable future. What can be done, though, is to strengthen the other major element of the NATO defense—its conventional capabilities—so that NATO cannot be easily pushed into the dilemma of surrendering large areas of European territory or initiating nuclear war. NATO's conventional capabilities must not appear so weak that they either invite attack or else convince the Pact leadership that early NATO use of nuclear weapons is inevitable and so preemption is unavoidable. Nor should NATO's conventional defense appear susceptible to systematic nuclear targeting. Behind a credible nuclear deterrent, the development of a stronger and more tenacious conventional defense could decrease Pact incentives to maintain large military forces and greatly improve the prospects for European arms reduction.

The foundation of a NATO politico-conventional defense must be a recognition that the ultimate deterrent is not simply NATO's military posture, but the entire complex of political, military, social and psychological factors which jointly inhibit the Warsaw Pact political leadership from initiating hostilities.

A major focus of the NATO political posture must be East Europe, an area which has experienced large scale change and growing diversity within the last 30 years. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan have clearly shown that the Soviets are prepared to use military force to counter threats to their control. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has been unable to stem creeping diversification and widening East European autonomy. In the early 1970's, efforts to reinforce Soviet political domination with economic ties through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) were beginning to weld a tighter integration of East European and Soviet economies. Then the global oil crisis forced the Soviet Union to pare down projected deliveries of Soviet oil to East Europe. This pushed these countries into the world market, significantly broadening their economic ties with the nonsocialist world and increasing the importance of hard currency trade for their economic development.¹⁵

Militarily, East European cooperation would be critical for the success of any Soviet attack on NATO Europe. Five hundred miles of Soviet lines of communications cross Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. About half of the immediately available Pact divisions in Central Europe are from these countries, but their wartime reliability is quite suspect.¹⁶ While the Soviets have clearly demonstrated they can coerce the East European countries into adopting desired internal policies and generally supporting Soviet foreign policy, it is questionable whether they could coerce them into war. It is patently clear that Soviet troops cannot be simultaneously used both to attack NATO and to coerce East Europe. And it is also clear that East European countries have a low incentive to participate in a European war which would involve high risks of domestic destruction with little promise of gain. The Soviets would have to shoulder high risks to initiate a European war without securing East European support, as noncooperation would pose serious military complications. But it is hard to project incentives which would induce East European political elites to support a European war in the absence of any credible threat from NATO unless these East European leaders were totally dependent upon the Soviet Union for their own political position.

From this point of view, increases in East European autonomy are important for European peace because they improve the capability of the East European nations to oppose any Warsaw Pact aggression against NATO. Clearly, such stability would be to the advantage of NATO, but it would also be to the advantage of East Europe and even to the Soviet Union.

This raises the elusive question of the offensive aspects of the NATO posture and the extent to which they can be seen as an actual and credible threat to East Europe.

In the immediate postwar period, despite the purely defensive concepts expressed in the NATO charter, there were widespread hopes that some day, somehow, an opportunity might arise for the Free World to "roll back" the Soviet occupation of East Europe. Such half-formed aspirations, although not codified into any formal alliance objectives or actual plans, were widely held and certainly were felt by the East European leaders, at that time totally dependent on the Soviet Union for their own positions of authority. NATO force structures were also compatible with these vague aspirations. Although smaller than the Soviet and satellite

forces, NATO's forces had a significant technological advantage, were backed by the US nuclear monopoly and were clearly capable of offensive as well as defensive operations should an unforeseen opportunity somehow arise. Tank divisions, fighter wings, artillery batteries and infantry battalions can all fight offensively and, indeed, prefer to do so.

The events in Hungary in 1956 forced NATO to confront these vague aspirations and to conclude, regretfully or not, that the prospects for a military solution to the Soviet domination of East Europe were simply negligible. Talk of "roll back" ceased, and with the rise of Soviet military strength, the very thought of a NATO attack on the East has become an absurdity. An absurdity, that is, to NATO. But not to the East. NATO's fighting elements still retain an inherent offensive capability. Unceasing propaganda in East Europe and the Soviet Union on the horrors of World War II keep alive the specter of a German menace. Even setting propaganda and ideology aside, the Soviets have a well-founded appreciation of the deep currents of hostility toward them in East Europe. Under these conditions, it would not take a particularly imaginative analyst to construct a scenario in which some unforeseen crisis sparks off widespread revolt in East Europe and then NATO or some of its forces attempt to capitalize on the situation. On a propaganda level, where ideological preconceptions are combined with the ogre of "German revanchism," the NATO threat can strike a responsive chord in East Europe. It serves as a basic justification for Soviet pressures to maintain excessively large defense establishments. To the extent that the NATO military posture can be pictured as offensive, it helps to shore up such justifications and even to gather an indeterminate amount of actual public support for large military forces. From this viewpoint, the more clearly defensive the NATO military posture, the harder it is for the Soviets to justify to East Europeans (and to their own population) high levels of military expenditures. Unfortunately, any change will certainly be painfully slow. The same type of vague aspirations which helped justify NATO military expenditures in the late 1940's and early 1950's probably still help to justify Soviet military expenditures—the hope that some day, somehow, turmoil in West Europe might provide an opportunity for Soviet military expansion. NATO's posture, while defensive, must show enough strength, cohesion and durability so that the Soviets eventually come to conclude, as NATO did in the late 1950's, that the

prospects for a military solution to European security are so remote that they cannot justify force levels significantly above those clearly needed for defense.¹⁷

Developments which offer alternatives to East Europeans can help to decrease the chances of war and to develop a long-term political solution to European security. As such, NATO nations, both individually and collectively, should encourage wider East European ties not only with the West, but with the Middle East and the Third World. This is an area where NATO and East European objectives can coincide, or at least be mutually supportive. But movement in this direction will doubtless stir Soviet discomfort. NATO must seek to convince the Soviet Union that such changes are ultimately in its own interests.

But ultimately is a long time away. For NATO, there will be no need for ultimate solutions if the short-term military strategy fails. The military strategy is in effect a holding strategy, an economy of force operation expending assets as necessary for defense while political, economic and psychological actions work to remove incentives for military solutions and to encourage the Soviets and East Europeans to shift resources into social programs and eventual peaceful competition in this area.

NATO's conventional defense must appear as a credible counter to the Pact conventional threat so that in a crisis situation the Soviets are not tempted into adventurism by an apparently weak opponent. The NATO posture must also be as resistant as possible to neutralization by nuclear, chemical or biological attack. It must have a clearly defensive orientation lending maximum support to NATO's political efforts. Such a conventional defense could be constructed from four main elements: Area Combat Troops, combat maneuver units, support troops and penetration elements.

Area Combat Troops would be strong territorial forces intended to engage Pact forces, neutralizing smaller elements and degrading the capabilities of larger elements so they could be more easily defeated by NATO air, artillery and maneuver units. They could eventually form the mainstay of a NATO conventional defense in the critical Central Region.

A number of European countries, including Norway, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, have strong territorial forces.¹⁸ Such forces have also been proposed for West Germany a number of times. Immediately after the war, British Air Marshal Sir John

Slessor strongly advocated such a defense by supplementing active divisions with a

highly trained semistatic Home Guard armed primarily with antitank guns with light automatics as the personal weapon. The Federal Republic...should be covered with a network of these units composed of local men, knowing every inch of the ground, every coppice and stream, land and side street, responsible for the defence of their own *Kreis* and town or village and inspired by the knowledge that they are protecting their own homes and their own kith and kin. They would be responsible for the storage and protection of land mines in peace and of laying the mine fields when so directed.... Their job would be to block every road and destroy every tank moving across country in their zone.¹⁹

Similarly, George Kennan in his 1958 Reith Lectures over the British Broadcasting Corporation stressed territorial forces as constituting the core of resistance in overrun areas; for this he was ridiculed by Willy Brandt in the German parliament.²⁰

The question naturally arises as to why the Germans have been so wary of the concept, particularly since irregular forces in World War II tied up dozens of German divisions. Germany, of all countries, should be most aware of the potential of such forces, yet emphatically rejects their use except in rear areas.

One major reason for this rejection is undoubtedly tied to considerations of forward defense. The development of territorial forces involves preparations to fight on one's own territory and can easily imply an anticipation of yielding territory. Indeed, the French, who have also developed strong territorial forces, emphasize unequivocally that their territorial forces are intended strictly for rear area security and not to repel invaders.²¹ What changes or considerations have made territorial forces more appropriate for the NATO defense in the Central Region?

One important change has been the NATO recognition that a military "roll back" is not a feasible solution and simply complicates the search for political resolution of East-West problems. Territorial forces can contribute to this search, but they have been faulted for their inability to conduct decisive operations against enemy combat forces. World War II German divisions were not defeated by irregular forces and no one expects that territorial forces in Norway, Switzerland, or Yugoslavia would be able to repel an invasion of their countries. However, in Central Europe,

territorial forces would be fighting in conjunction with sizable combat maneuver forces, supporting them by degrading enemy capabilities. As such, they have been termed Area Combat Troops to stress that their task is not to defend territory nor to provide a base for long-term resistance in occupied areas, but to conduct active combat operations. They would operate within a designated territorial area and would have two main tasks—rear area security behind NATO lines and active combat operations within overrun or penetrated areas. Their organization, equipment and training would reflect the peculiarities of their operational areas, such as urban, forest or mountain areas.

Within the NATO rear, Area Combat Troops would provide a dense network of forces capable of neutralizing any smaller Pact diversionary elements and of locating and fixing larger Pact penetrations so that they could be neutralized by other NATO combat forces.²²

As battle lines moved through or beyond their operational territory, the Area Combat Troops would remain to conduct operations against Pact forces, emphasizing standoff engagement of critical elements. Against combat forces, they would concentrate on command and ADA vehicles or unprotected troops at refueling or logistic stops. They would act to disrupt command and communications, ammunition and POL resupply, and key specialized elements.²³ They would also continuously pass information on Pact deployments to other NATO forces; destroy or contaminate supplies likely to be seized and used by Pact forces; encourage Pact desertions by providing haven to deserters; and incorporate any bypassed NATO units or personnel.

Thus, Area Combat Troops would form a stubborn, tenacious network of forces on which NATO maneuver elements would operate. They would insure that any Pact forces on NATO territory were subject to continuous attrition and disruption to degrade their capabilities as much as possible before engaging NATO maneuver elements.²⁴

One major consideration which makes territorial forces attractive is the sheer volume of military manpower which could be potentially involved. If NATO countries in the Central Region utilized their military resources at the same rate which Norway does (see Table 1), there would be an additional seven million troops available for NATO in this critical area. A more modest utilization could easily provide for several million. West Germany, in fact,

already has two million men in its General Reserve, which the International Institute for Strategic Studies does not even count in its military manpower figures because they have no concrete defense assignments.²⁵

Certainly NATO has a potential to significantly increase its manpower utilization in Europe and decrease its reliance on US reinforcement.²⁶ Since Area Combat Troops would generally operate in their own home regions, they could be mobilized on short notice, or even no notice at all. The bulk of them could have their basic equipment at home and be familiar with designated emergency rallying points. With such additional forces, NATO would not have to fight outnumbered.

Another major consideration favoring the utilization of Area Combat Troops is the high lethality and selectivity of modern weaponry.²⁷ Laser guided weapons, smart bombs and scatterable mines can provide significant augmentation firepower to personnel operating behind enemy lines. Likewise modern ammunition has greatly increased lethality. ICM and flechette ammunition are extremely effective against personnel in the open, including combat personnel at refueling or mess stops. Light rockets with modern warheads can penetrate heavy armor thicknesses—even the current 40mm grenade will penetrate up to two full inches of armor plate. Used in command-detonated, roadside-emplaced mines, such ammunition can be selectively targeted against command vehicles, traced ADA weapons and other critical equipment. Heavy caliber weapons (.50 caliber to 30mm) can be effective against all the Pact armored vehicles except medium or heavy tanks. Even light weapons are effective against many Pact rear area elements. Table 2 summarizes the vulnerability of Pact elements to various weapons which could be made available to light infantry forces.

Furthermore, by dispersing antiarmor weapons throughout the defended territory, Area Combat Troops could seriously undermine Soviet responses to these weapons.²⁸

An important characteristic of Area Combat Troops is that their dispersion and use of standoff engagements would decrease Pact incentives to use weapons of mass destruction. Operating elusively in small groups and having their own individual protective equipment, Area Combat Troops would make extremely poor targets for nuclear weapons and would be relatively safe from chemical or biological attack. Area Combat Troops could also

		On Call				Non Transportable													
		Air		Artillery or Missile		RESERVE		Mines		Light Mortar		ATGM		40mm Grenade		50 cal to 30mm		Machine Gun	
		IC	CV	Scudable	Missile	IC	CV	IC	CV	IC	CV	IC	CV	IC	CV	IC	CV	IC	CV
Aircraft	High Performance	X	X					X											
	Helicopter	X	X					X								X	X	X	
	Exposed Personnel	X		X	X					X	X			X	X			X	X
	Tank	Auxiliary Fuel	X		X	X				X	X		X	X	X	X			
	Vehicle	X	X	X				X	X										
	ATP, APCs	Exposed Personnel	X		X	X				X	X		X	X			X	S	X
	PT-76																		
	SP Artillery	Vehicle	X	X	X			X	X		X	X		X	X				
Armor	ZSU	Exposed Personnel	X		X	X				X	X		X	X			X	S	X
	SAM	Exposed Equipment	X		X	X				X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X
	Vehicle	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X		X	X				
	FROG	Exposed Personnel	X		X	X				X	X		X	X			X	S	X
	SCUD	Associated Vehicles	X	X	S	X	X	X	S	X	S	X	X	X	X	X	S	X	X
		Missiles/rockets	X		X	X				X	X	S	X	X		X	X		
		Prime Vehicles	X	X	S	X	X	X				S	X	X					
	Towed Art., mortars	Personnel	X		X	X			X	X	X		X	X			X	S	X
	Mortar, Bk Lobs	Vehicle	X	X	X	S	X	X	X	S	X	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	S
	Engineer Equip																		
	Chem Def Equip	Personnel	X		X	X			X	X	X		X	X			X	S	X
	Chem Elements	Critical Equipment	X			X	X					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	S
	Vehicle	X	X	S	X	X			S	X	S	X	X	X	X				
	LOG	Supply Points	X		X	X				X	X		X	X	X			S	X
	Admin	Cargo	X		X	X				X	X		X	X	X	X	X	S	X
	Vehicle	X		X	X				S	X	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
	Other	Personnel	X		X	X			X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	S	X
		Vehicle	X		X	X			S	X	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
	Passenger, Traffic Regulators								X				X	X		X	S	X	X

X = Effective S = Capable of Selective Engagement

Table 2. Effectiveness of Selected Weapons Against Typical Warsaw Pact Vehicles and Equipment

operate very effectively at night and in poor weather or difficult terrain, conditions which can significantly hamper many other NATO elements. They are ideally suited for operations in urban areas.²⁹

Furthermore, being reserve forces closely tied to operations within their own country, they would pose a minimal external threat and so provide maximum support to NATO political and diplomatic efforts. Overall, a dense net of Area Combat Troops could turn any rapid Pact sweep across Central Europe into a highly risky military maneuver. They could provide a tenacious defense which would insure continual opposition to Pact penetrations and significantly dim any Pact prospects for rapidly establishing control in overrun areas.

Question: How do armor elements move in a hostile environment

saturated with mines and snipers when every thicket, house, copse and ditch is a potential antiarmor position?

Answer: Slowly and carefully.

Nevertheless, this does not imply that Area Combat Troops provide a panacea for European defense. The recent strengthening of the German Territorial Army and the French experience with their Defense Operationnelle du Territoire have both shown that significant resources and careful planning are necessary. Training is also a constant problem in all the countries with large territorial reserve forces. Although the problem can be eased by design of relatively simple-to-operate weapons and by structuring a high degree of individual specialization into the system, constant work is needed to maintain the proficiency of territorial reservists. Additionally, there is a potentially severe problem of coordination between Area Combat Troops and regular forces. Again, careful planning and training are needed.

Thus, Area Combat Troops do not provide a simple answer, but they do offer NATO forces in Central Europe a direction for evolution toward a tough conventional defense which uses available manpower resources and yet is not threatening to East Europe or the Soviet Union.

The second major element of the NATO conventional defense would of course be regular combat units. Operating in close coordination with Area Combat Troops, they would complement each other's operations to inflict maximum casualties on any invading forces.¹⁰

Artillery units, using the intelligence supplied by the pervasive net of Area Combat Troops and the terminal homing of modern munitions could place very effective fire on enemy units closing with NATO units or penetrating into NATO controlled territory. By taking advantage of the capabilities of Area Combat Troops to soften up and disrupt Pact combat elements, NATO maneuver units could wage a much more effective mobile defense. Meeting engagements would be heavily weighted against the Pact forces.

Two specific components of the combat maneuver forces which are of particular importance are air defense and combat engineer troops. Air defense weapons are inherently defensive, and some (such as rapid fire guns) can also be used in a ground support role. Increases in these forces could thicken the NATO air defense umbrella to the extent that Pact attacks into the NATO rear, whether with fighter aircraft or with airborne or airmobile forces,

would become both very costly and relatively ineffective. By helping to reduce the air threat to NATO, air defense forces can reduce any Pact calculations of rapid destruction of the NATO rear area.

Combat engineer elements, on the other hand, are important for their role in the forward area. By laying mine fields and constructing barriers and fortifications,³¹ they could add to the defensive aspects of the NATO posture while further reducing Pact ability for rapid or deep penetration. Modern mine warfare could seriously hamper the movement of Pact armor elements, particularly if Area Combat Troops selectively engage Pact mine clearing equipment.³²

The third major element of the NATO combat force should be its support units. Every such unit should be prepared to break down into an effective infantry organization, not just rifle teams. Selected individuals should be trained in the use of the wide range of weapons available to such units, and the command group should be prepared to implement standard combat procedures such as requesting artillery support, reporting enemy movements and coordinating activities with adjacent units—most importantly with the Area Combat Troops. Basically, NATO support units which come under attack or find themselves in an area of enemy operations should be prepared to exert an active presence similar to and in conjunction with the Area Combat Troops.³³ NATO cannot afford to have large numbers of troops unable to fight effectively against Pact units.

The final major element of the NATO strategy should be penetration elements intended to fight within Pact territory. These forces would be of several general types. The first type, including Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols and light infantry elements, would operate in the Pact tactical rear area, with a mission of creating maximum confusion and disorganization. Ideally, these elements would be ready for insertion into Pact territory immediately following any Pact attack.

The second type of penetration elements would be Special Forces units for operations within the Pact strategic rear area in conjunction with disaffected elements of the indigenous populations.

The third type of penetration forces would be combat forces prepared to carry out raids and diversionary attacks throughout the Soviet Union. By increasing the potential for internal disorder, they

could provide additional disincentives for Soviet operations against NATO.¹⁴

Operations in the Pact strategic rear area would have a very different character from other NATO combat operations. Here the major Pact vulnerability is not primarily military, but rather psychological. Between NATO territory and the Soviet Union lies a 500 mile belt of East Europe where the populations have repeatedly shown a deep seated hostility to the Soviet Union. Even inside the Soviet Union numerous non-Russian nationalists have expressed strong dissatisfaction with their situation. NATO is poorly prepared to exploit this vulnerability. Such exploitation would rest heavily on two bases: psychological preparation and force development.

Concerning psychological preparation, the current NATO operational strategy of fighting only to restore borders works heavily against unrest among East European or Soviet nationality groups. Without some expectation of Western support, there is no incentive for them to resist Soviet operations. The potential for popular revolt in East Europe is a potential which NATO would certainly want to exploit in wartime. Even as a purely defensive alliance, NATO, if attacked, must have some capability to threaten damage to an aggressor.

From the force development point of view, US Special Forces are the only NATO elements currently prepared to exploit such vulnerabilities. Their presence is important not simply because of the military potential which can be credited to them, but even more because of the uncertainties which they add into the Euro-strategic situation. From the NATO point of view, their potential impact must be assessed as probably modest, but nevertheless with some potential to spark widespread unrest. From the Soviet point of view, this latter potential can be very disturbing, increasing the uncertainty of any calculations of military success and serving as an additional deterrent to initiating hostilities.

NATO penetration elements thus add an important dimension to the NATO military capabilities. They show that even under nonnuclear conditions, any Pact initiation of hostilities could result in fighting and destruction not only on NATO territory, but also on the Pact's own territory.

Such elements do, however, add an inherently offensive capability to the NATO posture, so their type and size must be carefully measured. They cannot be so strong so as to pose a

significant threat in their own right, but they must be strong enough to add imponderables into any Warsaw Pact assessments. Certainly a West German force prepared to operate outside Germany would provide a gratuitous bonus for the Pact propaganda machine. For East Europe in particular, the carrot of mutual cooperation with the West could be easily destroyed if the stick of a potential NATO counterthreat is constructed too sturdily. Yet some stick is necessary.

There is no military solution to this dilemma which is, after all, not a military dilemma. Rather, it is necessary to develop a political approach which recognizes the presence of a measured amount of offensive capability, but stresses its relatively modest size compared to NATO's defensive forces and to the Pact's own offensive forces.

Considering East Europe, the political approach has to stress the search for political solutions to East-West problems, but at the same time make it clear that a military attempt by the Pact will result in military countermeasures by NATO. NATO should recognize the territorial integrity and political legitimacy of the East European governments as long as they refrain from overt military action against the West. But if these governments join in any attack on NATO, such recognition should be withdrawn. NATO would then be free to take necessary and appropriate measures against Soviet lines of communication in East Europe.

The intent of the NATO stance must clearly be not to pose an unnecessary threat to the East Europeans, but to discourage their support of any Soviet plans for military action. At the same time, it must complicate any Soviet war planning and add additional uncertainties and imponderables into any assessments of the probability of a quick or decisive military victory.

A NATO politico-military defense would thus stress political efforts at solving the long-term problems of European security. NATO's military posture must be sufficiently strong to discourage Soviet military initiatives against West Europe, but it must have a clearly defensive orientation to undercut Soviet justifications and incentives for maintaining large Warsaw Pact standing forces, particularly armor-heavy units with strong offensive potential. At the same time, the NATO military posture must be such that it does not invite Pact nuclear strikes either by any apparent vulnerability to neutralization or by an overreliance on its own nuclear forces which could encourage Pact nuclear preemption. Rather the NATO military posture must seek to make nuclear warfare as poorly suited

as possible to European combat operations and thus form a sound basis for arms control negotiations on these weapons.³⁵

The proposed NATO military posture would center on a dense network of Area Combat Troops, composed largely of reservists prepared to conduct stubborn combat operations in their own home areas. By using contemporary developments in antiaarmor weapons they could neutralize the Pact potential for rapid armor thrusts in Central Europe while clearly posing no external threat outside NATO territory. These Area Combat Troops would be complemented by line combat units conducting a mobile defense and engaging any penetrating Pact units after they have suffered attrition by the Area Combat Troops. NATO support troops would develop their own capability for combat operations so that they could fight effectively not only against Pact airborne or airmobile units, but also against armor penetrations, utilizing the same techniques and in cooperation with Area Combat Troops. Finally, NATO penetration elements would provide a capability to spread combat operations into the Pact's own territory. Taken as a whole, the NATO military posture should add as many imponderables and uncertainties as possible into Pact assessments of military operations in Central Europe.³⁶

With its strong antiaarmor capabilities, it could seriously erode the potential utility of the Pact's massive armor forces. At the same time, its clearly defensive orientation would undermine the Pact rationalization for excessive standing military forces, and discourage the current high levels of Soviet military expenditures. By disabusing the Soviets of any notion of military or even political utility of high force levels in Europe, a credible NATO conventional defense could be a significant factor in encouraging shifts into economic and political competition and eventual cooperation.

This present paper indicates some potential lines of evolution for a NATO European strategy which can utilize available manpower resources to escape the rising spiral of deterrence through nuclear terror. But this must be integrated into a global strategic concept.

In the final analysis, what is most needed is a comprehensive Western strategy which clearly identifies its goals and then formulates a logical approach to their realization.³⁷

ENDNOTES

1. A stark assessment of the growing Warsaw Pact relative strength is in Justin Galen, "Restoring the NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance: 'The Art of the Impossible,'" *Armed Forces Journal International*, September 1978, pp. 32-33. See also: "Europe's New Balance of Power—A Warning from the NATO Chief," *US News and World Report*, June 5, 1978, pp. 20-22; William Schneider, Jr., "Soviet General Purpose Forces," *Orbis*, Spring 1977, pp. 99-105.
2. For a detailed discussion of the strategic imperatives for the forward defense, see: Colin S. Gray, *Defending NATO Europe*, Hudson Institute Report DNA-4567F, November 1977, pp. 8-16.
3. "Soviet Airborne Forces," *Aerospace International*, March-April 1973, p. 13; David C. Schlachter and Fred J. Stubbs, "Special Operations Forces: Not Applicable?" *Military Review*, February 1978, pp. 23-24; Robert Close, *Europe Without Defense?* New York: Pergamon Press, 1979, pp. 183-184; C.N. Donnelly, "Operations in the Enemy Rear," *International Defense Review*, No. 1, 1980, pp. 35-41.
4. Of the 17 combat-ready divisions potentially available for NATO reinforcement, 13 are from the United States (and 3 others are French); some other reinforcements of smaller units are also available (John M. Collins and Anthony H. Cordesman, *Imbalance of Power*, San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1978, pp. 284-287). For analysis of the problems in moving these US reinforcements and the need for their rapid support, see D.M.O. Miller, "Strategic Factors Affecting a Soviet Conventional Attack in Western Europe," *International Defense Review*, No. 6/1978, pp. 858-859; "US Ground Forces: Already Too Large to Fight," *The Defense Monitor*, November 1978, pp. 4-6; Robert Lucas Fischer, *Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces*, Adelphi Papers, No. 127, Autumn 1976, pp. 18-25; John Fialka, "Ill-Equipped, Undermanned US Army is Decimated in 'Nifty Nugget' Exercise," *The Washington Star*, November 2, 1979, pp. 1,2; Daniel Gans, "'Fight Outnumbered and Win'...Against What Odds?" *Military Review*, December 1980, pp. 31-46.
5. There is extensive commentary available on this subject. Representative views are: Henry A. Kissinger, "The Future of NATO," *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1979, p. 7; Alan L. Otten, "Europe and the US 'Umbrella,'" *Wall Street Journal*, August 30, 1979, p. 18; Irving Kristol, "NATO's Moment of Truth," *ibid.*, September 24, 1979, p. 30; Richard Burt, "Among Allies: Doubt on US," *The New York Times*, September 7, 1979, p. 15; William Van Cleve and S.T. Cohen, *Tactical Nuclear Weapons*, New York: Crane Russak and Co., 1978, pp. 88-93, 102.
6. Alton Frye, "Nuclear Weapons in Europe: No Exit From Ambivalence," *Survival*, May/June 1980, pp. 102-103; Kristol, p. 30.
7. Gary Eifried, "Russian CW: Our Achilles' Heel, Europe," *Army*, December 1979, pp. 24-28; Matthew Meselson and Julian Perry Robinson, "Chemical Warfare and Chemical Disarmament," *Scientific American*, April 1980, p. 38.
8. "Aspin Reports on Sverdlovsk Blast," *Defense Week*, June 30, 1980, p. 1.
9. One of the first detailed expositions of such a contingency was Drew Middleton's assessment of a "week or ten days" for the Pact to overrun much of Germany—*Can America Win the Next War?* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975, p. 256. This was soon followed by Sam Nunn and Dewey F. Bartlett, *NATO and the New Soviet Threat*, Report to the Committee on Armed Services, US

Senate, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1977 (also published in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, April-May 1977, pp. 36-49), which assessed a Soviet "ability to initiate a potentially devastating invasion of Europe with as little as a few days warning," (p. 4) and likely to reach the Rhine before NATO could even make a decision on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, a study by Belgian Major General Robert Close (eventually published in English as *Europe Without Defense?*) postulated in great detail a Soviet potential to advance to the Rhine in 48 hours or less (pp. 170-180), a view shared by the former Chief of US Air Force Intelligence, Major General George Keegan (*Aviation Week and Space Technology*, March 28, 1977, p. 47). A more recent report concluded that it was "extremely doubtful" that NATO could conduct a successful conventional defense (US Congress, House, Report of the Special Subcommittee on NATO Standardization, Interoperability and Readiness of the Committee on Armed Service, *NATO Standardization, Interoperability, and Readiness*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 2). On the other hand, Les Aspin, "A Surprise Attack on NATO-Refocusing the Debate," *NATO Review*, August 1977, critiques the short war scenarios, while General Alexander Haig, "'I Can Move Damned Fast,'" *Time*, December 11, 1978, pp. 42-44, details some of the recent NATO improvements. US Congress, Congressional Budget Office, *Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, December 1977, discusses optimistic and pessimistic assumptions (pp. 27-38); see also Galen, p. 37.

10. Marvine Howe, "Turk's War on Terrorism Is Bogged Down in Politics," *The New York Times*, July 30, 1980, p. 2.; "Angry Turks Resist New Policies and Higher Prices," *ibid.*, February 11, 1980; and Dusko Doder, "Economic Collapse Feared in Turkey," *The Washington Post*, February 10, 1980.

11. Andrew Wilson, *The Aegean Dispute*, Adelphi Papers, No. 155, Winter 1979/1980.

12. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Middle East Peace Package*, 1979, p. 14.

13. "Text of the Declaration of the Venice Economic Summit Meeting," *The New York Times*, June 24, 1980.

14. For detailed commentary on the broadening concerns of alliance security see: "Text of Vance Speech at Harvard on Foreign Policy," *ibid.*, June 6, 1980; Martin Hillenbrand, "NATO and Western Security in an Era of Transition," *International Security*, Fall 1977, pp. 3-24.

15. Jan F. Triska and Paul M. Cocks, *Political Development in Eastern Europe*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977; Ernst Kux, "Growing Tensions in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1980, pp. 21-37; Christopher D. Jones, "Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe," *World Politics*, January 1977, pp. 216-241.

16. Short of war, there can be no definitive determination of this point, but assessments give little basis for Soviet confidence. See: Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "Political Reliability in the Eastern European Warsaw Pact Armies," *Armed Forces and Society*, Winter 1980, pp. 270-296.

17. For a current view on offensive versus defensive orientations, see: Jonathan Alford, "NATO's Conventional Forces and the Soviet Mobilization Potential," *NATO Review*, June 1980, pp. 18-22. For commentary on East European views, see: Jack E. Owen, Jr., *Political and Strategic Assessment of the US Military*

Commitment to NATO, Annapolis: US Naval Academy, May 21, 1973, pp. 92-96.

18. For descriptions of these forces, see: Adam Roberts, *Nations in Arms*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976, chapters 3, 6 and 7.

19. Cited in Horst Menderhausen, *Territorial Defense in NATO and non-NATO Europe*, Rand Report R-1184-ISA, February 1973, p. 37.

20. *Encounters with Kennan*, Totowa, New Jersey: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1979, pp. 24, 66.

21. Pierre Michel, "La Nouvelle Orientation de la Defense Operationnelle du Territoire," *Defense Nationale*, January 1978, p. 42.

22. The West German Territorial Army (GTA) already performs these functions in the NATO rear area and has been considerably expanded in recent years (*White Paper 1979*, Bonn: The Federal Ministry of Defense, 1979, pp. 154-156); it does not, however, envision systematic operations in overrun areas.

23. The Warsaw Pact logistics infrastructure is assessed as an area of potentially disastrous shortcomings (Jacquelyn K. Davis and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Soviet Theater Strategy: Implications for NATO*, United States Strategic Institute Report 78-1, p. 44). See also C.N. Donnelly, "Rear Support for the Soviet Ground Forces," *International Defense Review*, No. 3/79, pp. 345-349; and "Tactical Problems Facing the Soviet Army," *ibid.*, No. 9/78, p. 1410; Graham H. Turbiville, "Soviet Logistic Support for Ground Operations," *Military Review*, July 1976, pp. 34-38; Richard P. Clayberg, *The Problem of Soviet Vulnerabilities*, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 30 December 1977, pp. 107-110.

24. Such a development of Area Combat Troops would be compatible with the "blocking divisions" advocated by Steven Canby ("Mutual Force Reductions: A Military Perspective," *International Security*, Winter 1978, p. 130). See also his earlier article "Dumping Nuclear Counterforce Incentives: Correcting NATO's Inferiority in Conventional Military Strength," *Orbis*, Spring 1975, pp. 54-55; William E. Simons, *Some Thoughts on Future European Defense*, Rand Report P-6188, August 1978, pp. 25-26; William O. Staudenmaier, "Territorial Defense: An Ace in the Hole for NATO," *Army*, February 1978, pp. 35-38 (with comments by Daniel D. Plants in *Army*, May 1978, p. 2, stressing the usefulness of these forces particularly in the enemy rear area); Close, p. 219 (stressing their use in forested or urban area); Walther Stutzle, "The Impact of New Conventional Weapon Technology on NATO Military Doctrine and Organization," *New Conventional Weapons and East-West Security, Part I*, Adelphi Paper No. 144, Spring 1978, pp. 26-27.

25. See *The Military Balance 1979-1980*, p. 25, and Rudolph Woller, ed., *Reservists-Partners at Home and Abroad*, Bonn: Wehr und Wissen, 1978, p. 8.

26. The assessment that NATO Europe could or should improve its reserve utilization is a very common one: Kenneth Hunt, *The Alliance and Europe: Part II: Defence with Fewer Men*, Adelphi Paper No. 98, Summer 1973, pp. 31-32; Close, pp. 195, 219; Robert Lucas Fischer, *Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces*, Adelphi Paper No. 127, Autumn 1976, pp. 35-40; Rudolf Woller, *Warsaw Pact Reserve Systems*, Munchen: Bernard and Graefe Verlag, 1978, pp. 20-21.

27. Staudenmaier, p. 36; George H. Heilmeier, "NATO Defense Technology Outlines," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, July 17, 1978, pp. 64-66; Palmer Osborn and William Bowen, "How To Defend Western Europe," *Fortune*, October 9, 1978, pp. 152-153; Antitank capabilities are critical, and this is an area of high

technological emphasis. See Robert Kennedy, 'Precision ATGMs and NATO Defense,' *Orbis*, Winter 1979, pp. 897-927; John J. Mearsheimer, "Precision-Guided Munitions and Conventional Deterrence," *Survival*, March/April 1979, pp. 69-71; John Marriott, "Anti-Tank Warfare," *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, May 1979, pp. 61-68; Stutze, M.R. Janay, "Carl Gustaf—A Weapon That Works!" *Military Review*, January 1979, pp. 59-63; "Army Unveils New Anti-Tank Weapon," *Armed Forces Journal International*, December 1970, pp. 12-13; Seymour Deitchman, *New Technology and Military Power*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

28. Standoff attacks by a pervasive network of individual weapons are probably the most cost-efficient antiarmor method of all. Certainly they directly attack the linchpin of Soviet protective doctrine—locating antitank defenses—and undermine its central assumption—that antitank defenses will be clustered and thus susceptible to evasive maneuver during the attack and to suppressive fires by area munitions and tank weapons. See: C.N. Donnelly, "Soviet Tactics for Overcoming NATO Anti-Tank Defenses," *International Defense Review*, No. 7, 1979, pp. 1099-1106; William P. Baxter, "Soviet Doctrine Responds to Antitank Missile Threat," *Army*, August 1980, pp. 29-32; David K. Anderson, "The Counter-Mobility Potential in the NATO Context," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1979, pp. 70-75, and Edward B. Atkeson, "Is the Soviet Army Obsolete?" *Army*, May 1974, pp. 10,16, stressing the imbalanced Soviet reliance on tanks.

29. For analysis of urban warfare under current conditions, see Quester, pp. 8-9; Fischer, p. 28n; Paul Bracken, "Urban Sprawl and NATO Defense," *Survival*, November/December 1976, pp. 254-260; P.H. Vigor, "Fighting in Built-Up Areas: A Soviet View—Part I," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, June 1977, pp. 331-347; C.N. Donnelly, "Fighting in Built-Up Areas: A Soviet View—Part II," *ibid.*, September 1977, pp. 63-67; "Soviet Techniques for Combat in Built-Up Areas," *International Defense Review*, No. 2/77, pp. 238-242; and US Army Science Board, *Final Report—Ad Hoc Group on Military Operations in Built-Up Areas (MOBA)*, Washington, 1978.

30. Current Soviet tactics (see: Stephen Shervais, Jr., " 'Forward Detachments' and the Soviet Nuclear Offensive," *Military Review*, April 1979, pp. 66-71, and Donald K. Griffin, "If the Soviets *Don't Mass*," *ibid.*, February 1979, pp. 2-13) require a more innovative and responsive NATO defense, see: Robert E. Wagner, "Active Defense and All That," *ibid.*, August 1980, pp. 4-13 and Floyd V. Churchill, "To Win the First Battle," *ibid.*, November 1978, pp. 60-69. Other articles stress the importance of continued operations by bypassed units (see Robert A. Frizzo, "The Forward Infantry Force Defense," *ibid.*, May 1980, pp. 20-29 and Joseph J. Angster, Jr., "Bypassed Enemy Forces and the Corps Attack," *ibid.*, January 1980, pp. 69-74), operations considerably easier to conduct against a net of Area Combat Troops.

31. Fortifications at selected key locations could serve to seriously hamper Pact intrusions. They have generally been a neglected force multiplier. See William O. Staudenmaier, "Some Strategic Implications of Fighting Outnumbered on the NATO Battlefield," *Military Review*, May 1980, pp. 45-46; and Raymond E. Bell, Jr., "Fighting From Fortified Battle Positions," *Army*, July 1979, pp. 34-39.

32. Mine warfare has also been a badly neglected component of the NATO posture. Recent developments have significantly increased its potential for slowing any Pact attack. Michael A. Andrews, "Tank-Delivered Scatterable Mines," *Military Review*, December 1978, pp. 34-39; Martin B. Chase, "Scatterable Mines,"

Army Research, Development and Acquisition Magazine, March-April 1980, pp. 6-9.

33. Edward A. Corcoran, "Support Troops in Combat Operations," *Army Logistician*, January-February 1978, pp. 18-23.

34. See William V. Kennedy ("Kamchatka: Nonnuclear Deterrent," *Military Review*, August 1978, pp. 12-18) for one interesting and thought-provoking article on such a strategic diversionary threat.

35. There is widespread disagreement on this point, with some analysts stressing an approach which would continue to center NATO strategy on nuclear weapons. See, for example: Colin Grey, Pierre M. Gallois, *Soviet Military Doctrine and European Defense*, Conflict Studies Security Report, No. 96, June 1978; Stewart Menaul, *NATO in the Eighties—A War-winning Strategy*, Conflict Studies, No. 117, April 1980; and Uve Nerlich, "Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1980, pp. 100-125. Others recommend a de-emphasis of these forces and improvements in conventional capabilities: Jonathan Alford, pp. 18-22; Ori Even-Tov, "The NATO Conventional Defense: Back to Reality," *Orbis*, Spring 1979, pp. 35-49; Calvin C. Seybold, "Mutual Destruction: A Deterrent to Nuclear War?" *Military Review*, September 1979, pp. 22-28.

36. The importance of uncertainties to a deterrent posture can hardly be overstressed. See: Stanley Sienkiewicz, "Observations on the Impact of Uncertainty in Strategic Analysis," *World Politics*, October 1979, pp. 90-110; Daniel O. Graham, *A New Strategy for the West*, Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 1977, pp. 49-50.

37. Edward Heath, "10 Precepts for a Strategy," *The New York Times*, March 19, 1980, p. A27; Wolfgang W.E. Samuel, "The Impossible Task—Defense Without Relevant Strategy," *Air University Review*, March-April 1980, pp. 15-25; Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, pp. 975-986.

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point where war would clearly be an unprofitable venture for the Warsaw Pact, such an approach offers opportunities to encourage a long-term reorientation from military into economic and social competition.



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